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1 The late philosopher Richard Rorty was at root an honest liberal, fearlessly ready to
trace  the  implications  of  his  democratic  commitments  into  deep  domains  of
metaphysical  inquiry.  He managed an intellectual  modesty  that  was  also  ruthlessly
iconoclastic, situating himself as a great warrior in the sophistic tradition stretching
back to Gorgias and continuing up through Nietzsche and later Wittgenstein. Like all
sophistry,  Rorty  took  aim  at  the  notion  of  Truth  itself,  challenging  the  idea  that
philosophy can sort out those vocabularies which provide access to The World as It Is
from those that cannot. In doing so, Rorty saw himself as increasing democratic respect
for  what  Foucault  called “the multiplicity  of  discourses,”  emphasizing that  ways of
seeing the world supposed to lack epistemic rigor need not be understood as imperfect
approximations of science or mathematics. Instead, Rorty envisioned a culture in which
science  and  math  are  seen  as  useful  descriptions,  but  not  because  they  deploy  a
“method”  which approximates  the  one  true  reality  nor  because  they  possess  some
property supposed to distinguish their ontological nature from, say, literature, poetry,
anthropology, or economics. The Rortian strategy for further democratizing culture,
then, was to drop the presumption of western philosophy as an activity that can bestow
epistemic privilege on deserving modes of inquiry. Replacing themes of objectivity with
themes of solidarity and hope is supposed to democratize discourse by equalizing them
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as  instruments  assessed  strictly  in  terms  of  their  greater  or  lesser  contribution  to
reducing  suffering  and  cruelty,  increasing  prosperity  and  freedom,  and  promoting
originality and happiness.
2 This neopragmatist deflation of metaphysical concepts commits itself to assessing the
historical trajectory of ideas strictly in terms of increases in human utility rather than
in virtue of their nearness to reality. Concretely, Rorty’s justification for the shift in
western science from Aristotle to Newton is not that Newton more accurately describes
the world, but that Newton’s discourse allows society to do and be what was previously
impossible.  More  generally,  the  ultimate  justificatory  criteria  for  any vocabulary  is
expansion of human capabilities, not correspondence between sign and signified. No
sphere of inquiry gets human beings “more in touch” with the non-human world, but
some ways of  speaking and thinking help achieve human goals  better  than others.
Rorty  spent  most  of  his  life  working  out  criticisms  of  non-pragmatist  philosophy,
cobbling together various historical sources to use as ammunition against the western
philosophical  tradition,  and  constructing  a  neopragmatist  vocabulary  that  –  as  he
himself once put it – shows loyalty to philosophy at the moment of its fall. His work is
important both to those looking for intellectual allies interested in moving philosophy
further toward pragmatism and to those who seek formidable opponents against which
to define their own positions as they seek to return philosophy to something of a firm
Platonic pathway.1
3 Skowroński has written a short book (henceforth VVANN) that seeks to harness the
“enormous potential” he finds in Rorty by offering a “sympathetic polemic” along with
repetitions of neopragmatist gestures in new and sometimes exciting contexts. At its
best,  the  book  reads  as  a  genuine  discussion  between  thinkers  inspired  by  Rorty,
exploring the nature, limits, and possibilities of neopragmatism today. Skowroński is
clear that he does not seek an exhaustive interpretation of Rorty’s work and so feels
refreshingly free to propose lines of thought, developing them just so far as he sees fit
before abandoning them in favor of  more fruitful  topics.  He encourages readers  to
engage chapters in any order they prefer and to sift through the text for whatever
suggestions they take to be provocative and insightful. The result is a text that may
strike readers as having a sort of freewheeling spirit, surely more systematic than, say,
the writings of Slavoj Žižek but far short of systematicity. 
4 This means, however, that those who read the book from beginning to end may be
frustrated  by  a  certain  lack  of  cohesion  in  the  text.  They  may  find  themselves
struggling  to  identify  unifying  threads  as  Skowroński  takes  Rortian  themes  on  an
intellectual  romp  through  a  near  hodgepodge  of  questions  concerning  parallels  to
Kantian  moral  philosophy  (Ch. 2),  Rorty’s  relation  to  humanist  traditions  (Ch. 3),
neopragmatist  readings of literature and aesthetics (Ch. 4),  film theory and cultural
politics  (Ch. 5),  and  even  Rorty’s  supposed  contributions  to  economics  (Ch. 6).  The
author is comfortable to leave these topics gathered under the label of cultural politics –
a  phrase  that  draws  its  propriety  from  Rorty’s  fourth  volume  of  collected  papers
Philosophy  as  Cultural  Politics –  without  always  explicitly  explaining  their
interconnections  to  readers.  This  being  the  case  the  text  sometimes  reads  like  a
discombobulated  collection  of  reflections  written  between  lengthy  intervals  rather
than a single coherent book project.
5 But as a final verdict this would be unfair to Skowroński. One prominent theme that
unites the six chapters of  VVANN is  an attempt to identify and improve on Rorty’s
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failure to think the factors that decisively explain the reception and influence of any
given discourse.  Skowroński  accepts that “correspondence to the World” cannot be
sufficient ground for why it is a particular audience favors one description of things
over another (not least of all because relations of correspondence are not themselves
literally verifiable), but he is similarly weary of Rorty’s de facto belief that “internal
factors” within a vocabulary – say, coherence, consistency, elegance, beauty, subtlety,
or marking of new possibilities – explain its cultural impact. Skowroński emphasizes
that “external factors” such as the operation of socio-economic norms and institutions
significantly explain when and where redescriptions become popular and influential. It
is the collection of contingent power relations and not rational argumentation or ideas
of the common good that govern adoption and elaboration of discourse. 
6 Rorty  did  not  disagree  with  Skowroński  that  external  factors  exert  decisive  causal
influence over intellectual history but insisted that precisely because that reception is
contingent and therefore historically singular not much can be said about it – certainly
not  by  philosophers  –  in  any  politically  effective  way.  He  held  a  sour  view  of
retrospective genealogical analysis, as one sees in his appropriation of both Nietzsche
and Foucault as “private ironists” whose writings he thought were of limited political
use.  Indeed,  Rorty’s  conservative  assessment of  many continental figures  prompted
some to claim that if his engagement would be typical of the Anglo-Saxon “analytic
tradition,” then perhaps the gap between English and non-English speakers should be
maintained.  Rorty’s  de  facto  skepticism toward historical  theorization was  once  on
display in response to questions about why it was that ocular metaphors concerning
the “mirror of nature” so prominently entered the fray of modern philosophy in the
17th  century.  “I  don’t  think  we  can  have  a  good  answer  to  that  question,”  Rorty
quipped. His neopragmatism, then, embodies a deep distrust of abilities to deliver on
Skowroński’s  demand  that  philosophers  explain  the  institutional  socio-economic
conditions  that  ground the  historical  movement  of  discourses.  Rorty  embraced the
contingency of history in a way that prevents saying much of anything very general
even  in  retrospect  about  historical  flux  in  ways  that  would  allow  the  drawing  of
political lessons.
7 Rorty, then, stands accused by Skowroński of what might be called a naive or truncated
historicism. His neopragmatic anti-foundationalism abandons along with essentialist
metaphysics  the  possibility  of  socio-theoretical  explanations  for  the  comprehensive
power dynamics that entrench discourses and give them their influential power. This
leaves Rorty reliant on a mere academic history of ideas as his historical explanation
for the rise and fall of discourses. But, as Skowroński notes, one need not throw out the
socially progressive baby with the foundationalist bathwater. To do so is to effectively
neglect  the  discourses  that  would  further  Rorty’s  axiological  democratic  and
humanistic  norms  if  they  were  not  suppressed by  dominant  powers.  Creating  a
democratic circulation of discourses requires theorizing the concrete levers of power
that  suppress  some  discourses  while  elevating others.  Moreover,  rather  than
abandoning outright the best of social theory, it is quite possible to adopt an ironist
attitude  toward  those  bodies  of  thinking  themselves  and  to  link  them  on  an
experimental basis to oppressed groups whose discourses are now being marginalized.
Skowroński’s  proposal,  then,  hopes  to  link  Rorty’s  anti-foundationalism with  social
theory  in  a  politically  experimental  way  that  need  not  discard  the  neopragmatic
commitment to historical contingency.
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8 Rorty’s unwillingness to theorize relations of power can be traced to his beliefs about
the dangers of ironic social theory and to his famous “hunch that Western social and
political thought may have had the last conceptual revolution it needs” (1989: 63). In
Rorty’s view, intellectuals serve the limited political role of expanding empathy and
solidarity  while “discoveries  about  who  is  being  made  to  suffer  can  be  left  to  the
workings of a free press, free universities, and enlightened public opinion.” In passages
like these, Rorty’s rejection of fallibilistic social theory is grounded in his belief that the
risks they introduce endanger a liberal institutional form that is ultimately the best
human beings  can hope for.  Radical  change brought  on by  deep analysis  of  power
dynamics is to be shunned in favor of traditional ‘bread and butter’ piecemeal reform
advanced via traditional liberal political parties.
9 Skowroński notes one particularly deep practical problem moral in nature that arises
from Rorty’s ironist Utilitarian liberalism concerning the possibility of interpersonal
comparison of well-being. If we were to agree with Rorty’s axiological normative claim
that  the reduction of  suffering is  the proper vision of  justice  on which to  advance
political society, “How do we describe suffering so as to limit it when we have different
and incompatible descriptions of suffering at hand?” (54). This is in fact a classic
problem facing any account  of  human well  being that  relies  ultimately  on discrete
mental states as a basis for judgment, but as Skowroński points out, the problem is even
deeper for Rorty given that he stresses the relativistic nature of suffering and abandons
all  objective criteria  for  such  assessments.  For  example,  whose  suffering  is  to  be
counted  as  most  deserving  of  finite  resources,  the  very  sick  or  the  uneducated?
Refugees fleeing persecution or victims of domestic violence? How should we allocate
money  between  groups  aimed  at  preventing  police  brutality  and  those  aimed  at
protecting the environment? 
10 Rorty  thinks  that  if  we  sustain  liberal  institutions  such  as  a  free  press  and  free
universities, then the “truth” on key matters will “take care of itself” (2005). But it is
obvious  today  that  ideological  plurality,  deep  division,  and  political  polarization
extends  even  beyond  disagreement  about  the  proper  content  and  ranking  of
descriptions of suffering to the very notion of freedom itself. Even where shared, the
concept  of  freedom  cannot  serve  as  an  uncontested  normative  basis  on  which  to
adjudicate  other  disputes  because  the  thick  meaning  of  freedom itself is  contested
terrain.  Liberal  capitalist  democracies  are  today  experiencing  a  crisis  of  trust  and
solidarity regarding not only universities (which are increasingly being privatized) and
the press (which is increasingly being branded as fake news), but also regarding the
competent operation of major legal and economic institutions themselves. The success
of figures such as Trump and Le Pen are mere symptoms of this decline. Seen with this
in  mind,  Rorty’s  reliance  on thinly  ‘free’  institutions  for  the  circulation of  ideas  is
nothing more than capitulation to whatever dominant forces hegemonize our concepts
along with an often blithe confidence that those forces will be capable of sustaining
liberal values.
11 The problem is that liberal capitalism is now producing potentially catastrophic global
problems in the midst of an historical moment when we see not only the absence of
effective  global  institutions  but  a  weakening  of  traditional  nation-states  vis-a-vis
private  capital.  Terrorism,  environmental  issues,  severe  poverty,  “posthuman”
biotechnology, and elite capture of political institutions are challenges insurmountable
without new forms of international institutional cooperation. There is a moment of
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utopianism in the apparently modest schemes of global taxation advanced by popular
economists  like  Thomas  Picketty.  A  one-percent  tax  on  cross-border  transactions
seems quite  reasonable from a strictly  monetary perspective,  but  the key difficulty
arises with the political task of constructing any proper enforcement agency that could
effectively constrain capital at the global level. A planet capable of doing that in a way
which  addresses  the  sale  of  weapons,  biotechnology,  natural  resources,  and  global
democracy would already at the institutional level be a good distance from traditional
liberal institutional arrangements as we have known them.
12 In the last decade of his life, Rorty began to embrace this need. In his “Globalization,
the Politics of Identity and Social Hope,” he admits: 
I  suspect  that  the  most  socially  useful  thing  we  can  do  is  to  continually  draw
attention of the educated publics of our respected countries to the need for a global
polity, which can develop some sort of countervailing power to that of the super-
rich. We should probably be doing more than we are to dramatize the changes in
the world economy which globalization is bringing about, and to remind our fellow
citizens that only global and political institutions can offset the power of all that
marvellously liquid and mobile capital. (1996: 233-4)
13 But what are we to take from this? Rorty appears in this passage to be tottering on the
brink  of  abandoning  his  liberal  faith.  Certainly  a  global  polity  strong  enough  to
constrain  both nation-states  and the  destructive  international  movement  of  capital
would entail a substantial departure from the institutional status quo. Further, Rorty
admits that a simple strengthening of existing institutions is unlikely to work. As he
writes,  “I  admit that the chance of  revitalizing the United Nations [and other such
global institutions] […] is slim” (234).
14 For those of us now living in a world deeply broken and unlikely to be fixed by the mere
patching  up  of  existing  liberal  institutions,  the  need  not  merely  to  communicate
realities but to identify and explain the socio-economic tendencies and reproductive
modes  of  global  capitalism  cries  out  for  the  very  reinvigoration  of  social  theory
outlined by Skowroński. Philosophy has always thrived in moments of crisis. The need
for new and apparently revolutionary discourses demands an understanding of factors
which repress them and which can disruptively explain how so many are indefatigably
committed to a social  order now eating itself.  Seen in light of  these imperatives,  a
failure to heed Skowroński’s suggestion would not only imply political quietism about
hegemonic powers but resignation toward the fate of humanity. It is no exaggeration to
say that the difficulty of grasping today’s structural power dynamics and the task of
imagining a feasible social alternative has literally become an existential issue.
15 Unfortunately, for all the abstract power of Skowroński’s vision, VVANN has very little
of the concrete analysis of structures that would explain the rise and fall of discourses.
I  suspect  that  at  the  end  of  the  day,  the  only  way  to  refute  Rorty’s  belief  that
philosophers have little to offer politics is to develop analyses that are in fact politically
fruitful. Nonetheless, texts like those offered by Skowroński help to plant the idea that
those sympathetic to ironist deflations of philosophy need not abandon philosophical
social  theory.  In this sense,  his  text can be understood as an important attempt to
redirect our attention both toward good social theory and the need to deploy it as a
tool in the brutal political task ahead. We will need all the help we can get reimagining
philosophy beyond Rorty  and putting it  to  work staving off  present  threats  to  the
democratic and humanistic values Rorty himself sought to promote. 
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NOTES
1. One such prominent thinker has suggested that just as Plato wrote dialogues like The Gorgias in
opposition to the sophists of his time, those interested in defending philosophy today should be
repeating that gesture with respect to the great sophists of our own time. One of the titles he
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